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NOTE
KEYSTONE, INC. V. TRIAD SYSTEMS
CORPORATION:
IS THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT
UNDERMINING
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT?
Bryan L. Quick
I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Supreme Court has refused to enforce
arbitration agreements in contracts that call for Montanans to
arbitrate outside of Montana.' Citing two state statutes, the
Montana Supreme Court relied on public policy to find the
arbitration agreement's forum selection clauses unenforceable,
when such clause called for the parties to arbitrate outside of
Montana. 2 The court has claimed that the statutes express a
public policy against forum selection clauses, calling for forums
outside of Montana, in both arbitration agreements and regular
contractual agreements. Thus, because the public policy applies
to all contracts (and not exclusively to arbitration agreements),
1. See Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp., 1998 MT 326, 24-30, 292 Mont.
229, It 24-30, 971 P.2d 1240, 24-30.
2. See id.
1
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the statutes were neither preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), nor in conflict with the intent of Congress and the
FAA preferring enforceability of arbitration clauses.3
In Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corporation,4 the
Montana Supreme Court refused to enforce the parties'
agreement to arbitrate in California and compelled arbitration
in Montana5 based upon the combination of Montana Code
Annotated ("MCA") section 28-2-7086 and MCA section 27-5-
323. 7 However, the Montana Supreme Court misinterpreted
prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent by ruling that the FAA did
not preempt MCA section 28-2-708 and MCA section 27-5-323.8
The Montana Supreme Court has initiated a trend of
circumventing the intent of Congress expressed in the FAA, 9 as
well as the Supremacy Clause 10 and the Commerce Clause,"
and the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the
FAA. 12 In addition, the obvious distaste for the FAA expressed
in Casarotto v. Lombardi by Justice Trieweiler 13  may
demonstrate the true reason for the court's seeming
unwillingness to apply the FAA correctly in all of the cases that
3. See id.
4. 1998 MT 326, 292 Mont. 229, 971 P.2d 1240.
5. Id. 1$ 24-30.
6. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2001), stating:
Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual
proceedings in ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he
may thus enforce his rights is void. This section does not effect the validity of
an agreement enforceable under Title 27, Chapter 5.
7. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (2001), stating:
An initial application must be made to the court of the county in which the
agreement provides the arbitration hearing must be held or, if the hearing has
been held, in the county in which it was held. Otherwise, the application must
be made in the county where the adverse party resides or has a place of
business or, if he has no residence or place of business in this state, to the court
of any county. All subsequent applications must be made to the court hearing
the initial application unless the court otherwise directs. No agreement
concerning venue involving a resident of this state is valid unless the
agreement requires that arbitration occur within the state of Montana. This
requirement may only be waived upon the advice of counsel as evidenced by
counsel's signature thereto.
8. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-708, 27-5-323.
9. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. See infra Part III.A.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See generally Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 382-85, 886 P.2d 931, 939-
41 (1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
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have come before the court. 14
This note will first examine how the Montana Supreme
Court has contradicted the precedent established by the U.S.
Supreme Court on the FAA. The note will also discuss how the
Montana Supreme Court's opinions are contravening the
congressional intent and purpose of the FAA. The note will
identify the reasons for concern with the Montana Supreme
Court's refusal to correctly apply the FAA to arbitration
agreements. The note will conclude by explaining how this
refusal might pose potential economic loss for Montana business
interests and ventures. 15
14. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 187, 188 analysis is beyond
the scope of this note. The conflict of laws question raised by the Montana Supreme
Courts' use of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 187, 188 is a complicated
and controversial one which would require its own separate analysis. The pre-emptive
power of the FAA regarding forum selection in arbitration clauses is the purpose of this
note and the controlling issue in Keystone. However, several scholars have called into
question the inconsistent application of the Second Restatement by the Montana
Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court has been viewed as adopting the Second
Restatement for contract conflicts and applying it in Casarotto; however, "a closer
reading of those decisions leaves serious doubts on whether they had actually followed
the Restatement." Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
1998; Twelfth Annual Survey, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 327, 333 (1999). See also infra text
accompanying note 22.
15. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the importance of enforcing international
arbitration agreements in the context of antitrust claims. The Court reasserted its
reasoning from Scherk v. Alberto-Culiver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), in Mitsubishi, where
the Court concluded:
[TIhat concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that
we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. at 629.
The Court also took note of prior reasoning from The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), where the Court stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629 (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9).
The Montana Supreme Court needs to realize that such concerns are not exclusive to
international markets, business, or industries. Finally, in Mitsubishi, the Court noted
its emphasis from Scherk:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to
any international business transaction .... A parochial refusal by the courts of
3
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II. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE PREEMPTIVE
POWER OF THE FAA
A. The Factual and Procedural Background of Keystone, Inc. v.
Triad Systems Corporation
In November 1994, Keystone, Inc. ("Keystone"), a Montana
corporation, and Triad Systems Corporation ("Triad"), a
California corporation, entered into a contract. These
sophisticated commercial parties (not private parties) negotiated
the terms of the contract for many months.' 6 The contract
required the parties to arbitrate any dispute before the
American Arbitration Association in California. 7 The terms of
the contract provided any dispute "will be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and
the State of California." 8
In November 1996, Keystone filed a complaint in Montana
district court against Triad for breach of warranty, breach of
contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. Triad
responded by arguing that the parties' contract required the
arbitration of a dispute before the American Arbitration
Association in California.' 9
Keystone, relying on MCA section 28-2-708, moved the
district court to compel arbitration in Montana, and Triad filed a
cross-motion to compel arbitration in California pursuant to the
terms of the arbitration agreement. 20 A Montana district court
held that section 28-2-708 was preempted by the FAA and
one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only
frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive
jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages .... [It would]
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial
agreements.
See id. at 631 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17).
Although commerce, business relations, and business transactions are far more secure
within the United States, and do not have the potential explosive political influences, the
major concerns of the U.S. Supreme Court in enforcing arbitration agreements should
not be lost on the Montana Supreme Court. Montana has its own concerns for attracting
and obtaining profitable companies for its workforce and profitable ventures for its
existing corporations in the state.
16. See Keystone, 1998 MT 326, I 12.
17. See id. 5.
18. Id. 9.
19. Id. 5.
20. Id. 16
Vol. 63
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granted Triad's motion to compel arbitration in California;
Keystone appealed. 21
B. The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Keystone v. Triad
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the
district court's holding. In an opinion written by Justice
Trieweiler, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that
Montana law governed the interpretation of the contract and
refused to apply California law as agreed by the parties.22 The
court reasoned that MCA section 28-2-708 had historically been
applied for two reasons: "(1) to protect Montana residents from
having to litigate outside of Montana; and (2) to invalidate pre-
dispute arbitration agreements."23 The court further determined
21. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 6.
22. See id., 14. The Court held the choice of law provisions in Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994), rev'd on other grounds by Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), governed the case and resolved the
question that Montana law was to interpret the contract is a separate controversial issue
not discussed in this note. The U.S. Supreme Court never ruled either way on the
Montana Supreme Court's choice of law analysis and application of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law § -188. The Court could have ruled on the conflicts of law
analysis, but probably found it unnecessary since the application of the FAA determined
the outcome of Casarotto. However, the Montana Supreme Court mistakes the Court's
silence on its application of § 188 as an approval. In Keystone, the court points to the
analysis in Casarotto as still valid precedent, but fails to do any true independent
analysis of § 188 on the facts in Keystone. The Montana Supreme Court spent seven
paragraphs laying out its choice of law precedent, as determined in Casarotto, but in
reality it read as an attempt to recover Casarotto from the U.S. Supreme Court's
overruling. Yet, the Montana Supreme Court spent only one cursory paragraph to say
that because the computer system was to distribute auto parts across Montana, and
Montana employees were trained by Keystone, that somehow all five factors of the
Second Restatement were satisfied in order for Montana law to control. See Keystone,
1998 MT 326, 91 4-17. In Keystone, the court stated:
We rely on [the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws] § 188 to determine
which state has a materially greater interest in the particular contract issue
and which state's law would apply in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties. The factors from § 188 that we consider include: (a) the place of
contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties.
Id. 10 (emphasis added). The court stated that "[miost significantly, however, the
contract was performed almost exclusively in Montana." Id. 12. However, this factual
determination is questionable given the district court's findings. In addition, the court
failed to do any analysis on any of the five factors, and at best mentions only facts to be
analyzed under (c), and possibly (b). See also supra text accompanying note 14.
23. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 17 (emphasis added). The court clearly states that
the statute had the historical purpose to find arbitration agreements invalid. These type
of state statutes were the very basis for Congress' enactment of the FAA. In addition,
5
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that whether MCA section 28-2-708 pertained to arbitration
contracts was unimportant because MCA section 27-5-323
provided the same protection for arbitration agreements, based
on a fundamental public policy which did not conflict with the
goals and policies of the FAA. 24 The court concluded that the
combined effect of the two statutes invalidated "only the portion
of the agreement which requires Keystone to arbitrate the
dispute outside of Montana."25
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. History and Background of the Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act to
overcome the overt hostility that state courts had demonstrated
towards contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes.26 Courts
throughout the country had continued to deny, and refused to
honor, arbitration agreements on the grounds that the removal
of courts' jurisdiction violated public policy.27  Congress
attempted to end this hostility by the FAA, United States Code,
Title 9, Section 2, which provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as
such purposes served as the basis for the U.S. Supreme Courts expansion of the FAA in
Southland, where the Court stated "we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the
[FAA] to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction." Stephen L. Hayford & Alan
R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 175, 192 (2002) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984)). The
Court found that "[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for
the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."
See id. (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 10).
24. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 20. See also supra text accompanying note 7.
25. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 29. See also infra Part IV.C.
26. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2002)).
27. See Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Pre-emptive Effect
upon the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 35, 65 (1997).
450 Vol. 63
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 28
According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Southland
Corporation v. Keating,29 the enactment of section 2 declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the state courts to require judicial forums for resolving claims
where the parties had agreed in a contract to resolve future
disputes by arbitration. 30
The FAA reserves power over the states on the authority of
Congress to enact rules under the Commerce Clause.31 The U.S.
Supreme Court examined this power and concluded that the
statute "is based upon ... the incontestable federal foundations
of control over interstate commerce." 32 Congress enacted the
FAA to prevent state and federal courts from reaching different
outcomes regarding the validity of arbitration agreements. 33
According to the Court, the FAA will preempt state statutes
which intend to make arbitration agreements unenforceable. 34
The Court has stated that there are only two limits to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements by the FAA:
[T]hey must be part of a written maritime contract or a contract
'evidencing a transaction involving commerce' and such clauses
may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.' We see nothing in the Act indicating
that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any
additional limitations under State law.35
As early as 1972, the Court held the choice of forum clause
made by sophisticated business persons in an arbitration
agreement should be honored and enforced "absent some
compelling and countervailing reason." 36
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,37 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the FAA preempted a section of the Securities Act,
which voided any waiver of judicial forum, because the
provisions of the FAA could not be ignored by the courts. 38 The
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
29. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
30. Seeid. at 9 .
31. Id. at 11. See also U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
32. Southland, 465 U.S. at 11 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin
Manufacturing Corp, 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924)).
33. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
34. See id. at 10.
35. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (emphasis added).
36. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
37. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
38. See id.
7
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Covurt reiterated its rejection of a doctrine which had allowed
state courts to ignore the voluntary forum selection clause of a
contract, unless the selected state provided a more convenient
forum.3 9 The Court concluded that a "forum clause should
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside."40
The U.S. Supreme Court, in determining the enforcement of
the FAA and an arbitration clause in international trade,
concluded that the agreement of the parties to eliminate the
uncertainty of a forum in advance is an indispensable element in
international trade, commerce, and contract. 41  A judicial
elimination of an arbitration clause would allow a party to
"repudiate its solemn promise."42
The Seventh Circuit has reasoned that the FAA mandated
courts to order parties to arbitrate "in accordance with the terms
of the agreement; one term of the agreement is the parties'
forum selection clause." 43 The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the
language "involving commerce" contained in section 2 of the
FAA and found such language not to be a limitation, but a
qualification, which allowed section 2 to apply to state and
federal courts.4 The Court held that forum shopping between
federal and state courts would frustrate the intent of Congress. 45
Therefore, if the arbitration clause were enforceable in federal
court it would also be enforceable in state court.46 The intent of
Congress to create a substantive rule was to foreclose state
legislatures from undercutting the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 47
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,48 the
U.S. Supreme Court noted the lack of procedural rules in the
FAA, but found their absence consistent with the main
congressional goal to ensure arbitration according to the terms
39. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518.
40. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (a case ruling on
the enforcement of an international arbitration agreement). See also supra text
accompanying note 15.
41. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518-19.
42. Id.
43. Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1984) overruled on other grounds
by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998).
44. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
45. Id. at 15.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 16.
48. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Vol. 63452
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of the parties' agreement.49 However, the Court noted that the
FAA does not contain a preemptive provision so as to occupy the
entire field of arbitration.50 The FAA's primary purpose is to
enforce private agreements to arbitrate. 51 Thus, when the
parties agree to be governed by a state law, then that state's
arbitration laws will control over the FAA. 52
In Perry v. Thomas,53 the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the
power of the FAA by holding that section 2 is a liberal policy
favoring arbitration "notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary."54 The FAA provides for
enforcing arbitration clauses within the full reach of the
Commerce Clause. The application of the FAA with the
Commerce Clause has resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding "that these agreements are to be rigorously enforce[d]."55
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,5 6
the Court explained the proper process for a court asked to
compel arbitration. The Court stated:
The first task of a court asked to compel arbitration is to
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.
The court is to make this determination by applying the "federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the Act."... And that body of
law counsels "that questions of arbitrability must be addressed
49. Volt, 489 U.s. at 476.
50. See id. at 476-77.
51. See id. at 479.
52. See id. A recent article gives the overall transformation, by the U.S. Supreme
Court, of the FAA to the current national policy favoring arbitration.
Over time the Supreme court has remade the FAA into the cornerstone of a
new "arbitration federalism." The remaking of the statute, far from
cataclysmic, has proceeded in stages. Drawing from Erie in diversity cases, the
Court came to interpret the FAA to supersede state anti-arbitration standards
in federal diversity cases. Then, applying a post-New Deal preemption
analysis, the Court expanded this "substantive" pro-arbitration policy into a
"national policy" applicable in state courts. Finally, on the assumption
Congress had acted pursuant to its full commerce clause powers in enacting
the FAA, the Court extended this "national policy" to all commercial contracts.
Over time, as the Court's attitude toward private arbitral choice shifted, the
original FAA's notions of circumscribed federal power succumbed to new
jurisdictional understandings.
Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REv. 175, 182 (2002).
53. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
54. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
55. Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985) (emphasis added)).
56. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
9
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with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration .... The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."57
In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson,58
the U.S. Supreme Court was asked by twenty states attorneys
general to overrule Southland, a landmark case for the FAA .59
The Alabama Supreme Court had determined, based upon a
state statute, that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement was
unenforceable "because the connection between the termite
contract and interstate was too slight."60 The Court found that
the "Commerce in fact" interpretation was applicable for the
FAA, "reading the Act's language as insisting that the
'transaction' in fact 'involve' interstate commerce, even if the
parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce
connection."'61 The Court reviewed the reach of section 2 of the
FAA, in a contract evidencing commerce, and concluded that a
broader reading of section 2 was the correct interpretation. 62
The Court reiterated that Congress did not want state and
federal courts reaching different outcomes about the validity of
arbitration. 63 Hence, state courts were not allowed to apply
state statutes invalidating arbitration agreements.6 4 The Court
stated that no case since Southland had eroded the authority of
the FAA; in fact Congress had "enacted legislation extending,
not retracting, the scope of arbitration. ''65
57. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
The Court has followed this continued line of reasoning to find that federal law, through
the Supremacy Clause, will preempt state statutes which interfere with, and are
contrary to the intent of Congress. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
108 (1992). In Gade, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 655, had a preemptive effect over state licensing acts.
Id. at 108-09 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)). The Court has gone
as far in this field to say that "even state regulation designed to protect vital state
interests must give way to paramount legislation." Id. at 108 (citing De Canas, 424 U.S.
at 357).
58. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
59. Id. at 272.
60. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269.
61. Id. at 281.
62. See id. at 273-83.
63. See id. at 272.
64. Id.
65. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (citing to 9
454 Vol. 63
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In Allied-Bruce, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
the first question regarding section 2 of the FAA concerns the
scope of the definition of the term "involving commerce."66
According to the Court, the term "involving commerce" is the
equivalent of "affecting commerce," and gives the FAA the
broadest possible reach under the Commerce Clause.67
Therefore, the FAA and section 2 apply when there is a contract
evidencing commerce which contains an arbitration
agreement. 68 The Court further held that section 2 does allow
states to protect "consumers against unfair pressure to agree to
a contract with an unwanted arbitration clause."69 However,
states may regulate section 2 and invalidate arbitration clauses
only under general contract principles and "upon such grounds
as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."70
But, states may not decide that a contract is fair enough to
enforce all of the contract's basic terms, and then refuse to
enforce the terms of the arbitration clause.71 Otherwise, to do so
would place arbitration clauses on unequal footing with
contracts and would run contrary to the FAA and the intent of
Congress.72
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,73 the Court reviewed
the construction of the FAA, the extent of "engaged in
commerce," and its reach through the Commerce Clause. 74 The
Court reiterated its reasoning in Allied-Bruce to overrule the
Court of Appeals, reasoning that the "expansive reading of
[section] 2, [in Allied-Bruce,] gives no reason to abandon the
precise reading of a provision that exempts contracts from the
FAA's coverage."75 However, the Court further reasoned that
the term "engaged in commerce" in section 1 of the FAA should
be viewed "with reference to the statutory context in which it is
U.S.C. § 15) (noting the elimination of the Act of State Doctrine as a bar to arbitration,
and sections 201-208 of Title 9 of the U.S. Code, which expanded the scope of the FAA
into international arbitration).
66. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273.
67. Id. at 274.
68. See id. at 277.
69. Id. at 281.
70. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002)).
71. Id. at 281.
72. Id.
73. 532 U.S.105 (2001).
74. See id. at 116-21.
75. Id. at 118-19.
455
11
Quick: Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corporation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2002
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
found and in a manner consistent with the FAA's purpose."76
The Court found that the "the text of the FAA forecloses the
construction of [section] 1 followed by the Court of Appeals... [,]
a construction that would exclude all employment contracts from
the FAA."77 The Court found that employment contracts calling
for arbitration were not exempted from the FAA under section
1.78 The Court noted that it would not "chip away at Southland
by indirection," and that "Congress had not moved to overturn
Southland,... and we now note that it has not done so in
response to Allied-Bruce itself."79
Federal courts have reviewed similar public policy concerns
expressed in the opinions of the Montana Supreme Court. A
provision of the Michigan Franchise Agreement Law was
preempted by the FAA because it had rendered void any
provision that called for arbitration outside of Michigan, and
thus, the law had imposed limitations on the agreement to
arbitrate.80 A law in Puerto Rico provided that any contract
clause that required an automobile dealer to adjust, arbitrate, or
litigate outside of Puerto Rico violated public policy and was null
and void.8' The U.S. Supreme Court found that the FAA
preempted the statute for invalidating arbitration clauses in
dealer's contracts because the public policy concern for forum
selection were not among the grounds that existed "in law or
equity for the revocation of any contract."8 2 The federal courts
have found that courts cannot rewrite the parties' arbitration
agreements and compel arbitration in a forum not selected and
enumerated in the parties' arbitration forum clause.8 3
The courts, overall, have established that when an
76. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118.
77. Id. at 119.
78. See id. at 123.
79. Id. at 122. The court noted that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute, it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Id. at 123 (quoting Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citations omitted)). Finally,
the Court noted that although Gilmer involved a federal statute instead of a state
statute, "the argument... that a state statute ought not to be denied state judicial
enforcement while awaiting the outcome of arbitration. That matter ... was addressed
in Southland and Allied-Bruce, and we do not revisit the question here." Id. at 123-24.
80. Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc. v. Whaler Graphics, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 708,
710 (D. Ariz. 1993).
81. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st
Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 473 U.S. 614, 621 (1985).
82. Id.
83. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Prouse, 831 F. Supp. 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Vol. 63
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agreement to arbitrate future claims is valid, the agreement on
the jurisdiction to govern the dispute must also be valid.84 The
U.S. Supreme Court has essentially created a presumption "that
arbitration agreements reflect mutual party intent" and are
enforceable, and "rebuttable only under traditional contract
revocation standards. "85
B. The Montana Supreme Court versus the
Federal Arbitration Act
In 1989, the Montana Supreme Court heard a dispute
between two Montana corporations regarding the application of
the FAA to an arbitration clause which stated that the American
Arbitration Association would resolve any dispute arising out of
the partnership agreements.86 The Montana Supreme Court
stated, at that time, that the "law is clear that if the contract
falls within the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act... then an
arbitration clause found in that contract must be enforced."87
The court determined that since five percent of one business was
comprised of out-of-state clients (thus evidencing interstate
commerce), the FAA controlled. 88
However, in 1994, the Montana Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Trieweiler, held that a contract with
an arbitration clause was not enforceable, and that the FAA did
not preempt state law. 89 The court reasoned that MCA section
27-5-114(4), which called for special notice requirements in order
to have a valid arbitration agreement, was enacted for the
following reasons: (1) to prevent Montanans from unknowingly
waiving their rights to the access to Montana courts; and (2) to
prevent Montanans having to arbitrate outside of Montana. 90
The court held that MCA section 27-5-114 established "a
fundamental public policy of Montana and the application of
84. See R. L. Martyn, Annotation, Validity and Effect, and Remedy in Respect, of
Contractual Stipulation to Submit Disputes to Arbitration in Another Jurisdiction, 12
A.L.R.3d 892 (1999).
85. Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role
in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 204 (2002) (citing generally Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)).
86. See William Gibson, Jr., Inc. v. James Graff Communications, 239 Mont. 335,
336-37, 780 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1989).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 373-77, 886 P.2d 931, 933-34 (1994)
rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
90. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 376, 886 P.2d at 935.
457
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Connecticut law would be contrary to that policy."91
The Montana Supreme Court had attempted to rely on some
of the language from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,92 which observed
that a California law, which was essentially procedural, did not
frustrate the policy of the FAA. 93 Relying on this reasoning, the
Montana Supreme Court found that MCA section 27-5-114(4)
(notice requirement) would not "undermine the goals and
policies of the FAA."94 However, the court stated that it would
not "decline to enforce arbitration agreements which are entered
into knowingly."95
Justice Weber, dissenting, stated that the court misapplied
MCA section 27-5-114 because there was no reference to
Montana law in the agreement, and the Montana laws on
arbitration in contracts were preempted by the coverage of the
FAA in the arbitration agreement. 96 Justice Gray, dissenting,
found that the court's analysis was incomplete and erroneous. 97
Justice Gray concluded that the notice requirement "totally
undermines the purposes of the FAA by rendering the parties'
arbitration agreement unenforceable."98
The United States Supreme Court, in Doctor's Associates,
Inc v. Casarotto,99 held that MCA section 27-5-114(4), and the
use of the language "subject to arbitration" conflicted with the
FAA, and was thereby preempted by the FAA. 100 The FAA,
section 2, provides for the "revocation of arbitration agreements
only upon 'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." '1 1 The Montana Supreme Court incorrectly
read Volt as limiting the preemptive force of section 2, and
91. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 376-77, 886 P.2d at 936.
92. 489 U.S. 468
93. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 380, 886 P.2d at 938.
94. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 380-81, 886 P.2d at 938.
95. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 381-82, 886 P.2d at 939 (emphasis added).
96. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 391, 886 P.2d at 945 (Weber, J., dissenting) (Turnage,
C.J., joining the foregoing dissent).
97. See Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 391, 886 P.2d at 945 (Weber, J., dissenting)
(Turnage, C.J., joining the foregoing dissent).
98. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 395, 886 P.2d at 947 (Gray, J., dissenting) (Turnage,
C.J., joining the foregoing dissent).
99. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
100. Id. at 688. See also MCA § 27-5-114(4) (1995) ("Notice that a contract is
subject to arbitration.., shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of
the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject
to arbitration.")
101. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 685 (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 11).
458 Vol. 63
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thereby did not ask the proper question from Volt: whether MCA
section 27-5-114(4) undermined the goals and policies of the
FAA. 102 The U.S. Supreme Court .remanded the case to the
Montana Supreme court in light of Allied-Bruce v. Dobson,
specifically finding that a state can only regulate arbitration
clauses upon the grounds that exist for the revocation of any
contract. 0 3 The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state could not:
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful,
for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an
unequal 'footing,' directly contrary to the Act's language and
Congress's intent. 104
On remand, the Montana Supreme Court adhered to its
original holding in Casarotto, and the U.S. Supreme Court was
left with no choice but to reverse in Doctor's Associates when the
Court heard the case a second time. 10 5 The U.S. Supreme Court
again reiterated that the language of the revocation of any
contract to be applicable only to general "contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening
[section] 2."106
In Doctor's Associates, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled
102. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 685.
103. See generally Doctor's Assocs. 517 U.S. 681.
104. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281).
105. See id. at 685. Given the small number of cases that are actually granted
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, one must add additional value to a decision, and
the direction of the Court, in that it felt strongly enough to address the issue again.
Thus, the Court's strong directions in the Casarotto opinions should have been followed
more closely and carefully by the Montana Supreme Court in the next line of cases that
came before the court on the FAA, apparently this was not the case.
Justice Trieweiler and Justice Hunt responded to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision by
not signing the remand. See Richard C. Rueben, Western Showdown: Two Montana
Judges Buck the U.S. Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 16. Justice Trieweiler and
Justice Hunt responded that the U.S. Supreme Court was "philosophically misguided"
and stated "[w]e cannot in good conscience be an instrument of a policy which is legally
unfounded, socially detrimental and philosophically misguided as the United States
Supreme Court's decision in this and other cases which interpret and apply the Federal
Arbitration Act." See id. Trieweiler continued by stating "[wihat you have here is a
bunch of out-of-state corporations imposing arbitration on local residents through
clauses buried in contracts of adhesion, and the U.S. Supreme Court saying that's OK."
See id. Mark R. Kavitz, an attorney representing Doctor's Associates, Inc. in Casarotto,
raised one of the more concerning issues, brought about by the Justice's refusal to sign
the Court's remand, by his response that "the action by the two justices sends the wrong
message. 'I don't know how they expect trial court judges to follow their orders if they
won't follow the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.' See id.
106. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
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the Montana Supreme Court's holding that MCA section 27-5-
114(4) did not conflict with the purpose and policies of the
FAA. 10 7 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana
Supreme Court again misapplied Volt as limiting the
preemptive force of section 2, and should have focused on
whether the goals and policies of the FAA would be undermined
by the statute. 08 The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that a
state court cannot "decide that a contract is fair enough to
enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause." 10 9 The Court found
that the Montana Supreme Court misread the holding in Volt,
because the Court's prior holding had only affected the order of
the proceedings, not the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement. 110 The purpose of the FAA is to see that arbitration
agreements are enforced according to the terms of the
agreement; hence, the enforcement of a state law agreed upon in
the parties' arbitration agreement would not undermine the
purposes of the FAA."'
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if the state law
applies only to the "validity, revocability, and enforceability," of
any contract, referring to those "contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability," then the state law may
invalidate an arbitration agreement without conflicting with
section 2 of the FAA. 112 The Court held that a state statute will
conflict with the FAA, and should be preempted by the FAA, if
the state law puts special notice conditions on arbitration
agreements which are not applicable to contracts generally." 3
IV. PUBLIC POLICY VERSUS THE FAA
The Montana Supreme Court incorrectly held in Keystone,
Inc. v. Triad Systems Corporation that the FAA preempted
neither MCA section 28-2-708 nor MCA section 27-5-323.114 The
court reasoned that the combined effect of the statutes
invalidated only the arbitration requirement to the forum
outside of Montana, and then found that the remaining
107. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688.
108. See id. at 684.
109. Id. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281).
110. Id. at 687-88.
111. Id. at 688.
112. Id. at 686-87.
113. Id. at 687.
114. 1998 MT 326, 29, 292 Mont. 229, 29, 971 P.2d 1240, 29.
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arbitration agreement was valid.115  However, the court's
holding did not conform to the purposes of the FAA, or the U.S.
Supreme Court's precedent, or the court's own precedent. 116 The
court's holding that the public policies contained within the
statutes limited the enforcement of the arbitration agreement to
resolve disputes in California directly conflicted with the goals
and polices of the FAA.
A. MCA Section 27-5-323 Versus the FAA
The Montana Supreme Court relied, in part, upon MCA
section 27-5-323 to invalidate the arbitration agreement in
Keystone. However, the court failed to analyze separately
whether the FAA preempted MCA section 27-5-323 because it
undermined the intent of Congress. The court also failed to
explain how the requirement of an attorney signature for an
arbitration agreement was the same requirement made to all
contracts generally under Montana law.
The Montana Supreme Court found that whether or not
MCA section 28-2-708 applied to an arbitration agreement was
not important, because MCA section 27-5-323 provided public
policy protection against forum selection outside of Montana in
arbitration agreements. 117  The relevant language of MCA
section 27-5-323 states: "No agreement concerning venue
involving a resident of this state is valid unless the agreement
requires that arbitration occur within the state of Montana.
This requirement may only be waived upon the advice of counsel
as evidenced by counsel's signature thereto.""l
115. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 29.
116. See generally Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 292 Mont. 229, 971 P.2d 1240. In fact,
the court only truly addressed MCA § 27-5-323, and in doing so, the court never
addressed whether that statute could have been preempted by the FAA, or whether it
was contrary to the intent of Congress. See also infra text accompanying note 141.
117. See Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 18.
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (2001) (emphasis added). In full MCA § 27-5-323
states:
An initial application must be made to the court of the county in which the
agreement provides the arbitration hearing must be held or, if the hearing has
been held, in the county in which it was held. Otherwise, the application must
be made in the county where the adverse party resides or has a place of
business or, if he has no residence or place of business in the state, to the court
of any county. All subsequent applications must be made to the court hearing
the initial application unless the court otherwise directs. No agreement
concerning venue involving a resident of this state is valid unless the
agreement requires that arbitration occur within the state of Montana. This
requirement may only be waived upon the advice of counsel as evidence by
17
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The court reasoned that since there was no evidence of this
right being waived, after the advice of counsel, the statute
required arbitration in Montana. 119  The court noted the
language from Doctor's Associates, preempting state laws that
restrict arbitration agreements, but went on to focus on Volt,
again, stating that when state law does not conflict with the
FAA, such law is not pre-empted. 120 The court characterized its
understanding from the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Doctor's Associates "to stand for the proposition that a state law
may not 'place arbitration clauses on unequal footing' from
general contract provisions."12 However, the question applied
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Volt, and emphasized in Doctor's
Associates, was whether the statute would frustrate the intent of
Congress and the purpose of the FAA.' 22
The Montana Supreme Court's analysis appears to ignore
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Doctor's Associates, holding
that the application of a state statute invalidating arbitration
clauses by requiring first page notice of arbitration conflicted
with the FAA.123 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the proper
inquiry with a state statute was whether the application of that
statute "undermine[s] the goals and policies of the FAA. "124 Yet,
nowhere in Keystone did the Montana Supreme Court follow this
preliminary instruction established by the U.S. Supreme Court
in several decisions, including Doctor's Associates. 25
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the language from Volt
dictated that state law is preempted when it conflicts with
federal law and stands as an obstacle to the purposes of
counsel's signature thereto.
119. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 9 22.
120. See id.
121. Id. 11 23-24.
122. See Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 685 (quoting Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 381, 886 P2d 931,
938 (1994)). The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Montana Supreme Court did use
this necessary question in Casarotto. See id. (citing Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 381, 886
P.2d at 938). However, the Court also noted the Montana Supreme Court conclusion was
at odds with the Court's precedent. The Court continued by finding that the Montana
Supreme Court's decision was in error because it did not enforce the arbitration clause,
but invalidated it. See id. The Court held that a state law that 'places arbitration
agreements apart from 'any contract,' and singularly limits their validity... is thus
inconsonant with, and is therefore preempted by, the federal law." Id.
125. See Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 1 16-23. See also Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at
462 Vol. 63
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Congress. 126 The policy of the FAA is to rigorously enforce
arbitration agreements. 27 As the Montana Supreme Court read
Allied-Bruce too narrowly in Casarotto, the court now appears to
have read Doctor's Associates too narrowly by ignoring the U.S.
Supreme Court precedent that only "general applicable contract
defenses such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be used
to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening
[section] 2 [of the FAA]." 128 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has
extended the FAA by limiting section 2 only to the defenses of
basic formation issues of contracting. However, the Montana
Supreme Court narrowed the FAA by not addressing the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning and findings when the court cited to
Doctor's Associates.
The Montana Supreme Court relied too heavily upon the
language of putting arbitration agreements on equal footing
with contracts generally. 129  However, given the court's
reasoning, the court erred by the using MCA section 27-5-323 as
it did because the language of the statute directly conflicts with
section 2. This is especially true when MCA section 27-5-323 is
reviewed in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's instructions in
Doctor's Associates: would MCA section 27-5-323 "undermine the
goals and policies of the FAA.' 30
MCA section 27-5-323 states that arbitration venue clauses
are invalid unless the arbitration is to take place in the state of
Montana.' 3 ' There is no Montana statute that applies the same
language of MCA section 27-5-323 to contracts generally. In
fact, MCA section 25-2-202 allows parties to change venue by
agreement, at least within Montana, without a requirement of
an attorney's signature. 32 MCA section 27-5-323 states that an
effective waiver of Montana as the forum for arbitration requires
the advice of counsel and the signature of counsel as proof.133
Again, such language is not used in a statute to apply to
contracts generally. The requirement for a party to have the
advice of counsel in an arbitration agreement is not a general
126. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
127. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987).
128. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
129. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, T 25.
130. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (quoting Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 381,
886 P2d at 938).
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (2001).
132. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-2-202 (2001).
133. Id.
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requirement of "law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.'
34
In Doctor's Associates, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
first page requirement in MCA section 27-5-114 "singularly
limits" the validity of the parties' arbitration agreement;
therefore, the statute was preempted by the FAA. 135 The Court
held that: "[T]he State's law conditions the enforceability of
arbitration agreements on compliance with special notice
requirements not applicable to contracts generally. The FAA
thus displaces the Montana statute with respect to arbitration
agreements covered by the Act."1 36
Similarly, the provisions in MCA section 27-5-323
singularly limits arbitration and will void the enforcement of the
parties' arbitration agreements, according to the terms of the
contract, based upon a requirement that is not a precondition of
an enforceable contract. MCA section 27-5-323 on its face would
be inconsistent with the goals and policies of the FAA.
Therefore, MCA section 27-5-323 should have been pre-empted
by the FAA, just as the U.S. Supreme Court held MCA section
27-5-114 was preempted by the FAA. 37
B. MCA Section 28-2-708 Versus the FAA
The Montana Supreme Court, in Keystone, attempted to
square its lack of proper analysis of MCA section 28-2-708 by
finding that MCA section 27-5-323 provided public policy
protection against forum selection outside of Montana in
arbitration agreements. 38 However, the court failed to do a
separate analysis of whether MCA section 28-2-708 was
preempted by the FAA. Keystone's argument for the court to
invalidate the forum clause was based upon the premise that
MCA section 28-2-708 rendered void forum selection outside of
Montana, due to public policy. 39
MCA section 28-2-708 states:
Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party
thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract
by the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits
time within which he may thus enforce his rights is void. This
134. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002)).
135. Id. at 688.
136. Id. at 687.
137. See id.
138. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 18.
139. Id. T 19.
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section does not affect the validity of an agreement enforceable
under Title 27, section 5.140
The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the use of MCA section
28-2-708 in two prior contract cases in an effort to show that
forum restrictions applied to contracts generally. 141 However,
the court found that MCA section 28-2-708 had two historical
purposes: "() to protect Montana residents from having to
litigate outside of Montana; and (2) to invalidate pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.'42
While the Montana Supreme Court's initial reasoning
appeared valid, the court's reasoning fell flat for numerous
reasons. First, the court never addressed Triad's argument: (a)
that arbitration does not apply to MCA section 28-2-708 because
the terms "usual proceeding"' in "ordinary tribunals" did not
apply, yet the court had relied upon these terms in prior
decisions; and (b) that the section states the validity of an
enforceable agreement under Title 27, Section 5, the Montana
Uniform Arbitration Act, is not affected. 43  Instead of
addressing Triad's arguments, the court quickly attempted to
apply two prior cases without first reviewing the statute.1
Second, the Montana Supreme Court misapplied the two
prior cases, Polaris and Rindal, in this context, in an effort to
establish the policy reasons against forums outside of
Montana. 145 The analysis (a) in Polaris relies upon the phrases
"usual proceedings" in the "ordinary tribunals" to determine the
court's holding,146 which the Triad court never addressed, and
140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2001).
141. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 18 (citing Rindal v. Seckler Co., 786 F. Supp. 890,
894 (D. Mont. 1992); State ex rel. Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 215 Mont. 110, 111,
695 P.2d 471, 472 (1985)).
But see Electrical Products Consolidated v. Bodell, 132 Mont. 243, 247-48, 316
P.2d 788, 790 (1957). The Montana Supreme Court upheld a forum selection clause in a
contract finding "the parties have a right to stipulate in advance where any action arising
under a contract may be tried." In addition, the court found the stipulation in no way
restricted the defendant from enforcing her rights by the usual proceedings in the
ordinary tribunals. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 18 (emphasis added).
143. See id. 16. This raises another question of whether the FAA would then
apply or Title 27, Section 5 of the MCA, which essentially would mean MCA § 27-5-323.
However, for reasons discussed earlier, MCA § 27-5-323 could never stand up to the
scrutiny of whether it frustrated the intent of Congress and the FAA. Therefore, the
FAA, again, would preempt MCA § 27-5-323, leaving the original arbitration agreement
of the parties fully enforceable.
144. See Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 17.
145. See id. IT 18-19.
146. See Polaris Indus., 215 Mont. at 111, 695 P.2d at 472.
465
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(b) Rindal relies on an analysis of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 147
and the Erie doctrine, for a due process analysis to create the
public policy.' 48 The court's analysis in Rindal cites to Polaris
only for its holding and the analysis on public policy against
forums outside of Montana. 149 The reliance Polaris and Rindal
still did not determine the applicability of the language in MCA
section 28-2-708 to an arbitration agreement. The court did not
follow the analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court advised in
Doctor's Associates. Most importantly, the Montana Supreme
Court failed to address prior precedent which stated that the
FAA created procedural and substantive law under the
Commerce Clause, "notwithstanding the Erie doctrine."150
147. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
148. See Rindal, 786 F. Supp. at 892 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)).
But see Young Lee, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in
Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 674-79 (1997). The
article points out:
[Tihe outcome of an Erie analysis regarding forum selection clauses in
diversity cases remains far from predictable, as evidenced by a circuit split
concerning the issue of whether state or federal law applies to the
enforceability of forum selection clauses. While the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits follow the federal policy of holding forum clauses prima facie
valid, the Third and Eighth Circuits diverge from this trend.
Id. at 676 (emphasis added) (citing Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d
509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding federal law applies to interpret a forum selection clause
because "forum selection is primarily a venue mater") (additional citations omitted)). See
e.g. Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, mandated enforcement of forum
selection clauses absent a showing of fraud).
See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). The U.S.
Supreme Court noted that an analysis regarding the enforceability of a forum clause,
which was a vital part of the agreement, must begin with The Bremen holding that
"although not 'historically... favored,' [forum selection clauses,] are 'prima facie valid."
Id. at 589 (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9-10). The Court went on to refine this
analysis in cases with a purely routine contract, "nearly identical to every commercial
passage contract." Id. at 593. The Court reasoned that a non-negotiated contract forum
clause was still valid because: "[flirst, a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the
flora in which it potentially could be subject to suit;" second, a cruise line carries
passengers from many locales, and the cruise line could find itself in several different
flora; third, a clause dispels confusion over "where suits arising from the contract must
be brought and defended," saving litigation time and expense over pretrial forum
motions; finally, a passenger who purchases a ticket containing a forum selection clause
benefits from the reduced fares, enjoyed by the companies savings by limiting the
numerous potential judicial forums. Id. at 594-595. The Court found that, absent bad
faith, such clauses are enforceable. Id. at 595.
149. Rindal, 786 F.Supp. at 891-92 (citing Polaris, 215 Mont.ll0, 695 P.2d 471).
150. William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-Emption by Federal Arbitration Act (9
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) of State Laws Prohibiting or Restricting Formation or Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements, 108 A.L.R. FED.179 § 2 (2000) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
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Third, the Montana Supreme Court ignored precedent of the
U.S. Supreme Court, when the court relied upon a state statute,
MCA section 28-2-708, with the historical purpose "to invalidate
pre-dispute arbitration agreements."151 Contrary to the court's
reasoning, the intent of Congress enacting section 2 was to
create a national policy favoring arbitration by foreclosing state
legislative attempts to undermine the enforceability of
arbitration claims. 152 The language used by the court showed
that MCA section 28-2-708 was intended to undermine the
intent of Congress by undermining the goals and policies of the
FAA.153
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to rule that section
2 is a liberal policy favoring arbitration "notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."15 4 The
FAA provides for the enforcement of arbitration clauses within
the full reach of the Commerce Clause and "these agreements
are to be rigorously enforce [d]."155 The FAA will preempt any
state law which interferes with, or is contrary to, the FAA, and
such law must yield to federal law. 56 MCA section 28-2-708,
historically, was to invalidate arbitration agreements, and is
therefore contrary to the intent of Congress. Thus, MCA section
28-2-708 must yield to the preemptive power of the FAA.
C. Partial Enforcement of an Arbitration Agreement
In Keystone, the Montana Supreme Court held: "[Tihat the
combined effect of these statutes, as applied to the arbitration
provision in this case, invalidates only that portion of the
provision in this case which requires Keystone to arbitrate the
dispute outside of Montana." 57 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that states were not allowed to enforce the basic
principles of a contract but not enforce the arbitration
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
151. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 17.
152. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 9.
153. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489.
154. Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, by the court's findings, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-
2-708, with the purpose to undermined arbitration agreements, was the type of statutes
Congress had intended to preempt through the FAA. See also Keystone, 1998 MT 326, [
17.
155. Perry, 482 U.S. at 491.
156. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
157. Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 29.
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agreement. 158 The Montana Supreme Court appeared to ignore
this simple precedent by holding that all aspects of the contract
were enforceable, including the agreement to arbitrate, and
finding the forum clause unenforceable. 159
The Montana Supreme Court also appeared to ignore its
own precedent in Casarotto where the court had stated it would
not decline to enforce an arbitration agreement when the parties
entered into the arbitration clause knowingly. 160  Yet in
Keystone, the parties entered into the contract after many
months of negotiations in California and Montana. 161 The
parties in Keystone were both successful business entities, which
would have made it very difficult for the court to find that they
did not enter into the arbitration agreement knowingly. And
yet, in Keystone, the court never addressed its prior language
from Casarotto, or the precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court
on the partial enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
D. The National Policy Favors Arbitration.
The Montana Supreme Court appears to have
misunderstood, or ignored, all of the prior holdings of the U.S.
Supreme Court which have been strongly reiterated by the
Court since Southland.162 Section 2 declared a national policy
favoring arbitration, and withdrew the power of the state courts
to require judicial forums for resolving claims when the parties
had agreed otherwise in a contract for arbitration.163 In fact, the
U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed the reach of section 2 of the
FAA in a contract evidencing commerce and concluded that the
broader reading and purpose of section 2 was the correct
interpretation. 164
158. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281.
159. See Keystone, 1998 MT 326, 91 29.
160. See Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 381-82, 886 P.2d at 939. The court made no
finding in Keystone that the contract was one of adhesion, or distress, or fraud, in fact
the court notes the parties entered into the agreement after months of negotiations. See
Keystone, 1998 MT 326, $1 12.
161. See Keystone, 1998 MT 326, $1 12.
162. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 9.
163. See id.
164. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268. See also infra 22.
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V. PERSONAL OPINIONS GETTING IN THE WAY OF APPLYING THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Justice Trieweiler's Specially Concurring Opinion in
Casarotto is Philosophically Misguided
Justice Trieweiler, who has written several decisions for the
Montana Supreme Court in cases involving an arbitration issue,
also wrote a specially concurring opinion in Casarotto to discuss
the enforcement of the FAA in state courts. 165 In his specially
concurring opinion, Justice Trieweiler expressed his view that
federal judges only used the FAA as a way to control heavy case
loads and looked on the "reluctance of state courts to apply the
FAA as a sign of intellectual inadequacy. " 166
In Casarotto, Justice Trieweiler openly discussed his beliefs
in the enforcement and preemption of the FAA on states.
Justice Trieweiler stated that federal judges force the FAA upon
state courts "as the panacea for their [(federal judges)] 'heavy
case loads' and who consider the reluctance of state courts to buy
into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual
inadequacy."1 67 Justice Trieweiler continued by stating that
there are rules of law for venue and jurisdiction based upon the
idea that it is "unfair to force people to travel long distances"
and Montana courts are accessible in fairness, regardless of
wealth or political power.168  Justice Trieweiler continued to
address the federal bench, stating:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at
the appellate level, to understand is that due to their
misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that
arbitration provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly
bargained for, all of these procedural safeguards and substantive
laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick
a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed
contract and require the party with inferior bargaining power to
sign it. 169
165. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 382, 886 P.2d at 939.
166. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 382, 886 P.2d at 939 (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring).
167. Id. (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
168. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 382-83, 886 P.2d 939 (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring).
169. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 383, 886 P.2d at 940 (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring).
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Justice Trieweiler added that he was "offended by the
attitudes of federal judges, typified by the remarks of Judge
Selya in the First Circuit," who support arbitration as a
contractual device because they help to ease the overcrowded
federal courts. 170  Justice Trieweiler stated that nowhere in
Judge Selya's opinions did Judge Selya acknowledge a court who
resists arbitration, like Montana, who has "a case load typically
three times as great as Justice Selya's case load."171 Justice
Trieweiler continued by stating that the federal courts have
made the FAA a perversion and an "open hostility to any
legislative effort to assure that unsophisticated parties to
contracts of adhesion at least understand the rights they are
giving up."172 Justice Trieweiler added:
It seems to me that judges who have let their concern for their
own crowded docket overcome their concern for the rights they are
entrusted with should step aside and let someone else assume
their burdens. The last I checked, there were plenty of capable
people willing to do so. 173
B. ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE TRIEWEILER'S PERSONAL ATTACK ON
THE FAA
By verbally attacking the federal bench, and specific
members of the bench, Justice Trieweiler clearly mixes his role
as a Justice of the court with his own personal beliefs. Justice
Trieweiler ignored the direct precedent laid out by the U.S.
Supreme Court, in which the Court stated that the FAA created
procedural and substantive law under the Commerce Clause,
notwithstanding the Erie doctrine. 174 Thus, Justice Trieweiler's
170. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 383, 886 P.2d at 940 (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring). Justice Trieweiler cites to Judge Selya's comments from Securities Industry
Ass'n v. Conolly, 883 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.1989), where arbitration is called:
[an] "increased resort to the courts' as the cause for "tumefaction of already-
swollen court calendars" [and] as "a contractual device that relieves some of
the organic pressure by operating as a shunt, allowing parties to resolve
disputes outside of the legal system" [and] that "the hope has long been that
the Act could serve as a therapy for the ailment of the crowded docket."
Id. (quoting Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1116).
171. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 384, 886 P.2d at 940 (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring).
172. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 385, 886 P.2d at 941 (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring).
173. Id. (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
174. William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-Emption by Federal Arbitration Act (9
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) of State Laws Prohibiting or Restricting Formation or Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements, 108 A.L.R. FED. 179 (2000) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
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arguments for state controlled venue had already been quashed
by the U.S. Supreme Court's application of the FAA.175
Justice Trieweiler stated that the federal courts had
misinterpreted the congressional intent of the FAA by naively
assuming that parties knowingly bargain for arbitration
provisions and choice of law provisions. 176 However, Justice
Trieweiler is not in the position to re-analyze Congressional
intent for a federal statute, especially when the U.S. Supreme
Court had previously ruled the opposite in numerous cases,
including in a case reversing the Montana Supreme Court in
Doctor's Associates. 77 Justice Trieweiler's statement that he
was offended by the attitudes of federal judges like Judge Selya
in the First Circuit, who, according to Justice Trieweiler, only
supports arbitration clauses because they help to ease the
overcrowded federal courts, was improper and not judicious.
Justice Trieweiler's claim that nowhere in Judge Selya's
prior opinions does he acknowledge courts who resist
arbitration, like Montana, having "a case load typically three
times as great as Justice Selya's case load" not only reflects
Justice Trieweiler's dislike of the FAA, but misses the issue of
Congressional intent and the Supremacy Clause. 78 Justice
Trieweiler's statement that the federal courts have made the
FAA a perversion and an "open hostility to any legislative effort
to assure unsophisticated parties in contracts of adhesion at
least understand the rights they are giving up" shows another
example of hostility and bias towards the true policy of the
FAA. 179 Justice Trieweiler only continued to prove his personal
bias against the FAA by stating that federal judges who have let
their concern for their own crowded docket overcome their
concern "should step aside and let someone else assume their
burdens."180
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
175. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987); Volt Info. Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1989); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
176. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 383, 886 P.2d at 940.
177. See Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. 681 (1996). See also supra text accompanying
note 158.
178. See Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. 681. Justice Trieweiler's comment also appears
to be in the tone of a self-congratulating complement that not only serves to show his
bias, but that the FAA is being undermined by the Montana Supreme Court.
179. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 385, 886 P.2d at 941.
180. Id.
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C. The Precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court Versus Justice
Trieweiler's Opinion.
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to reiterate the
power of the FAA over conflicting state laws by holding that
section 2 embodies a liberal policy favoring arbitration
"notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to
the contrary." 181 The FAA provides for the enforcement of
arbitration clauses within the full reach of the Commerce
Clause. The application of the FAA with the Commerce Clause
has resulted in the Supreme Court's holdings "that these
agreements are to be 'rigorously enforce [dl.'"182 The Court has
held that the FAA preempted a state statute which made
arbitration agreements in wage collection claims
unenforceable. 8 3 Any state law which interferes with or is
contrary to the FAA must yield to federal law.18 4 The FAA was
not set up for a set of procedural rules, but to ensure arbitration
according to the terms of the parties' agreement. 8 5 The FAA's
primary purpose is to enforce the private agreements of parties
to arbitrate. 86
Justice Trieweiler erred in challenging federal judges for
their willingness to enforce the national policy of a broad
interpretation of the FAA. 8 7 Justice Trieweiler's opinion of the
FAA, as an excuse to lighten the dockets of courts, in
combination with his view that the FAA is unfair in enforcing
arbitration agreements for forums outside of Montana, runs
contrary to the policy of the FAA to enforce arbitration
agreements as agreed to by the parties. 88 Unfortunately, there
is no way to avoid Justice Trieweiler's biases when reviewing his
opinions for the Montana Supreme Court involving the FAA or
in any future arbitration agreement dispute before the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court in Keystone would have been
181. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
182. Id. at 490 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
183. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 490.
184. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
185. Volt Info. Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
476 (1989).
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9 (1984).
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overruled if it had been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, as
will, and rightfully so, all future cases by the court which apply
such a narrow reading of the policy and intent of the FAA. In
Doctor's Associates, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly instructed
Montana Supreme Court that it had misread and misapplied
prior cases, specifically Volt, by narrowly interpreting the policy
and preemptive power of the FAA. 189 The Montana Supreme
Court has continued to misapply prior cases and to narrow the
FAA by holding that state statutes, which run contrary to the
purposes of Congress, are not preempted by the FAA because
those statutes established public policy.
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to be frustrated with the
continued need to re-apply Southland and by the need to
reiterate the history and purpose of the FAA. 190 The frustration
of Court, combined with the continued excuses of state courts to
comply with the purposes of the FAA, could ultimately result in
the Congressional enactment of new federal substantive law
over all interstate arbitration agreements. At the very least, the
U.S. Supreme Court will again overrule the Montana Supreme
Court for its circumvention of the FAA. The Montana Supreme
Court will continue to be overruled, at great financial cost to the
parties, until the court complies with the polices of the FAA to
"enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate ... in
accordance with their terms."191
The likely outcome, and the most unfortunate, is the result
the court's decisions could have on the much needed growth of
outside business into the state of Montana. The companies,
especially small businesses, that would be looking to do business
in Montana, or with Montana companies, will be far more
careful before they enter into contracts that will leave them at
the mercy of the Montana Supreme Court for the enforcement of
bargained for arbitration agreements. As companies attempt to
lower the risks of high cost litigation, and look to alternative
dispute resolution as a means of keeping business ventures
working despite disagreements, they have no choice but to be
overly cautious as a result of the protectionist attitude of the
Montana Supreme Court.
The Montana Supreme Court's analysis in Keystone, while
not surprising, is disappointing. The court's failure to realize
189. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
190. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
191. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
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the importance of the FAA policy to enforce a party to arbitrate
according to that party's promises is frustrating. Apparently the
court's promise not to "decline to enforce arbitration agreements
which are entered into knowingly"192 cannot be relied on by
companies seeking to do business in Montana. The purpose of
the FAA, since its Congressional enactment in 1925, to overcome
the overt hostility of state courts towards contractual
agreements to arbitrate disputes, has still not been realized in
Montana.193
192. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 381-82, 886 P.2d 931, 939.
193. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
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